Abstract: This paper tries to show that framing a propedeutics for a given discipline necessarily presupposes some so-called analytical movements with which the conceptual frame of the discipline could be related to itself, and to other disciplines as well. The situation is the same with communication studies, where, as this paper proposes, many of the so-called axioms of human communication should have been analyzed. After explicating the main types of analysis, the discussion tries to apply its analytical methods on Watzlawick's first axiom of human communication, and tries to show, that the statement that 'one cannot not communicate' is either false or meaningless.
In the logic, or more precisely, in the dialectics of Aristotle ἀνάλὔσις means the process of the reduction of the imperfect figures into the perfect one. So analysis originally means a problem solving method, where the problem could be physical (as in the case of releasing a knot) and intellectual (as in the case of clarifying an ambiguous situation) as well. The manifold interpretations of the verb ἀναλύω (which stands for the English 'to analyze') strengthen the notion that analysis means, first of all, clarification, because ἀναλύω means to unloose, to undo, to set free, to cancel faults, to release from a spell.
But the fact that analysis is clarification could be affirmed without reference to its etymology: suffice it to say that the methods that call themselves analysis do clarification. Of course this short paper could not present a historically coherent picture of the concept of analysis, but it could delineate the most characteristic types. Let us suppose, that the logical structure of ‹Analysis› runs as follows. (1) Analysis ‹analyser i... ;‹analysandum i... ;analysans i... ››
The formula (1) means that the process of analysis should be interpreted as ordering, which requires three necessary constituents. So analyses include the matching of (at least) one analysandum and (at least) one analysans by (at least) one analyser, where the analysandum is the target of the analysis (which has to be analysed); analysans is the product, and analyser is the agent of the analysis. In linguistic terms, analysis could be interpreted with thematic roles i as follows.
(2) The analyser analyses the analysandum for the analysans. The formulas (2) -(2d) show that, logically, the analysans depends on the analysandum which depends on the analyser. Of course it could be assumed that in an "analysis" the analysandum depends on the analysans, but in this case the analysis should be accounted as fake, or the thematic roles should be inverted as in (3).
(3) (x)AG > dep (y)PRD > dep (z)TRG  (x)AG > dep (y)TRG > dep (z)PRD
The above mentioned consideration could be easily illustrated by a simple type of analysis, namely translation. Let's suppose that an agent tries to translate the English verb 'to occur' to German. Then the analysis would be translation, the analysandum would be the verb 'to occur', and the analysans would be 'vorkommen', and 'to occure' should be precede 'vorkommen'. When an agent tries to find an adequate match for 'vorkommen', then 'vorkommen' will be the analysandum, and 'to occure' will be the analysans. Of course, in the case of a simple translation, this kind of inversion could be easily perceived, but it should be kept in mind in the case of less common analyses too. But the indefinite constituents of the formula (1) show that (1) could be interpreted many ways depending on the indices of the arguments. It means that, for example, plural analysans with singular analysandum makes a different kind of analysis than singular analysans with plural analysandum. Actually, every interpretation of (1) constitutes a type of it, so the following interpretations all have the logical structure of (1), but the same time they are quite unlike in practice.
On the types of analysis
The statement that definition could be interpreted as a kind of analysis maybe run against the philosophical tradition but it may be tenable upon further consideration. The logical structure of definition runs as follows. The formulas under (4) show that here definition fixates the intensional equality of two expressions, namely 'communication' and 'information processing'. But a definition of this kind could be prosperous only if both expressions are parts of the language, and at least one of them is well known or retraceable to some self-evident fact or entity. The most famous example of definition of this kind is the circumscribe of bachelor as wifeless man, and definitions of this kind are usually called as analytical. Of course there are many wifeless men that could never be considered as bachelors, while no bachelor could have wife that squarely shows that analytical definitions could constitute semantical implications instead of intensional equality.
ii Definitions of this kind could be easily found in the field of social sciences, and they could be called as methodological definitions.
But there are another sort of definitions that mostly take place in the field of formal sciences including mathematics and logics. Here definition means constituting, as in the case of (5). simplification, organs could be considered as entities supervene on cells which supervene on atoms). Second, it could be interpreted horizontally, which means that analysandum is a complex of analysans (as a table is a complex of its legs and leaf). But in both cases reductive analysis affirms that the analysandum could be examinable in the terms of the analysans (which statement evokes hard controversies in connection with the limits and fields of many disciplines, for example in the case of the philosophy of mind).
Second, interpreting the symbol of identity (≡) v in the case of the formula (6c) raises many problems. It is obvious enough, that, in the case of reductive analysis, the analysans and the analysandum could not be merely synonyms, because the analytic level of the analysans must be more elementary than the analysandum's. So, first of all, (6c) could be interpreted extensionally, which means that the reference of the analysandum and the reference of the analysans is one and the same (of course, this way of interpretations could lead to serious problems in mathematics and social sciences. Moreover, it's very hard to imagine, that a reference of this kind could be find for 'communication' and 'information processing'). An alternative interpretation could suggest that that formula (6c) should be interpreted intensionally, which means that the meaning of the analysandum and the meaning of the analysans is one and the same. Here reduction should show that the meaning of the analysandum could be derived from the meaning of the analysans, which means that the concept for the analysandum conceptually depends on the concept for the analysans (and, of course, this interpretation raises all the philosophical questions in connection with 'meaning'. For example, it's hard to maintain the idea that the concept of 'communication' depends (conceptually, logically or even epistemologically) on the concepts of 'information' and 'processing'). And, finally, (6c) could be interpreted methodologically, which means that phenomena could be described as communication could be exhaustively described as information processing -on a more basical level. Methodological interpretations are very popular in social sciences, and, in connection with 'communication as information processing', it does not raise any serious philosophical problem -because of the fact that it seems to be simply false.
But the earlier mentioned presupposition of most reductive analyses -that the analysans is somehow more elementary than the analysandum -is not necessarily prevails. Instead of being more elementary, analysans could be held as a problem-solving appliance. This conception presupposes that the analysandum and the analysans are being able to fill the same cognitive function, while the analysans eliminates some -usually scientific or philosophical -problem which holds with the use of the analysandum. A similar view had been held by Quine (1960) who though that a reductive analysis of this kind is, in fact, not an analysis but a construction, where the analyser generates constructions instead of decomposing complex formulas.
A third kind of reductive analysis, namely explication (Carnap 1967) In the case of an explication, as it could be seen by the formalism, an explicator usually orders only one analysans for many analysandum. Because of the fact that the direction of an explication is seemingly just the opposite as the direction of analysis (in a narrow sense), which usually orders many analysans for an analysandum, a question may be raised whether explication is an instance of analysis or synthesis, but this question should not be answered here.
As opposed to reductive analyses, a logical analysis won't drive the analysis to 'more basical levels' but it tries to brighten the logical structure of the analysandum. In this case the analysans belong to a dictionary of a logical system L, as in the case of (8).
(8a) Logical analysis ‹analyser‹description i ‹…analysandum…››
The analyser Ag logical-analyse (every communication is a kind of information processing) T for (x FxGx) P .
Here logical analysis could show that, for example in the case of (6e), if something is affirmed as communication the same thing must be affirmed as information processing. Of course formulas with entailment could not be inverted, so a logical analysis of this kind could not be considered as a class of definition. So the logical description under (8e) would be false for communication in every case when something could be affirmed as communication but the same thing (or event, or action etc) could not be affirmed as information processing. In other cases the entailment will be true. But it's easy to see that (8e) can not be true since there are many examples of communication that do not contain information processing at all (for example in the cases of "fatic" communication).
An additional kind of analysis is the conceptual analysis which is concerned with the N natural (or ordinary) language. A conceptual analysis usually investigates the logical structure of ordinary language and the so-called normal usage of a given expression which includes the investigation of the conditions by which an expression could or could not be applied for an entity. So a conceptual analysis could serve as a propedeutics for a given discipline but, because of its firm binding to the natural language, could not be an instrument for setting it up.
The last kind of analysis should be mentioned here is the so-called connective analysis (Strawson 1992 ) which tries to explain the analysandum and its relations with other concepts without substituting it, which means that in the case of a connective analysis the analysandum could be a part of the analysans. In short, connective analysis could be considered as a minimum concept of analysis, as If conceptual analysis should be considered as a tool for constructing a propedeutics for a given discipline, then connective analysis should be considered as a tool for searching the position of it in connection with other disciplines. So it could be said without oversimplification that conceptual analyses should proceed, and connective analyses should follow the setting up of a discipline. It's obvious at first sight that in the statement (11) the expression 'communicating' falls under an act-category, but it's far more obscure what the reference of 'one' could be. Anyway, the logical structure of (11) could be formalized as follows:
(11a) ‹x› ‹Fx› which means that it's not possible for an x that x is not F, and it could be transformed as (11b) shows; (11b) ‹x› ‹Fx› which means that it's necessary for an x that x is F. So the most broad interpretation of (11) says that everything must communicate, which could be narrowed by the famous Quineian approach as every being must communicate. vii As it will be seen, this narrower interpretation still suffers from philosophical problems but, at least, liberates non-existent entities from the compulsion of communication. Since in logic the substantive verb 'to be' could not be handled as a predicate, but as a quantifier, the undermentioned interpretations both have the logical form of (11b).
(11ba) If x exists, than x must communicate.
(11bb) If x communicates, than x must exist.
(11ba) says that communication includes viii existence, because from (11ba) it follows by modus tollens that if x does not communicate it could not exist and by modus ponens it is impossible for x that it exists and do not communicate; but when x is non-existent than x is free to communicate or not.
ix (11bb) rather says that existence includes communication, because from (11bb) it follows by modus tollens that if x do not exist it could not communicate and by modus ponens it is impossible for x that it exists and do not communicate; but when x does not communicate it is free to be or not to be. It could be seen that (11ba) and (11bb) contradict each other because (11bb) allows x to be and not to communicate which is impossible by (11ba). And, because of it, (11bb) contradicts to the statement that one cannot not communicate. But with a Quineian paraphrase (11b) could be interpreted in a third way as follows. Consider that (11bc) expresses and identity statement x ; then it seems that the meaning of 'to be' is the same as the meaning of 'to communicate'.
xi Consider again that (11bc) could be regarded as any kind of analysis from definition to reductive analysis etc. Then the question may be raised: which component of (11bc) is the analysandum, and which one is the analysans? (11bca) and (11bcb) In the case of the former, the analyser tries to explicate the meaning of existence, while he takes the meaning of communication for granted. In the case of the latter, the analyser tries to explicate the meaning of communication, while he takes the meaning of existence for granted. But in both cases, 'to communicate' entails 'to be' and 'to be' entails 'to communicate', so the logical connective between the concept of communication and the concept of existence is biconditional (iff). It means that, literally, everything that communicates exists, and everything that exist communicates. However, this biconditional evokes many problems in both directions that could not be discussed here in details, but two considerations should be proposed. First, the statement that which communicates exist seems intuitively true but trivial since it's hard to imagine anything which communicates in spite of the fact that it do not exist or, at least, it must had been existed. But the same could be predicated on almost every verb say 'to sit' or 'to see' etc, so this statement is not too informative. Second, the statement that which exists communicates seems intuitively problematic since there are entities that not communicates in the strict sense of the word 'to communicate', for example, it's hard to say that an armchair or the Milky Way communicates. But this second statement is obviously far more interesting than the first one, since the theological interpretation of communication could corroborate the conception that which exists communicates.
xii Of course an analysis of this interpretation could not be performed here. Naturally, the idea behind the statement (11) surely narrows the scope of predication to human agents, which is revealable from the original text of Watzlawick's. Though (11) is the most quoted form of the original idea -which leads, as it was discussed above, to indefensible or, at least, problematic consequences -a refined interpretation of the idea may be proved tenable. Consider the statement expressed by (12). (12) A human agent cannot not communicate.
The logical form of (12) Now consider the logical structure of the argumentation.
(12da) ‹x› Fx  G‹x›
which is equivalent with (12ea)- (12ec) (12ea) ‹x› Fx  G‹x›
which means that if 'to behave' includes 'to be a human agent' and 'to communicate' includes 'to behave' than 'to communicate' includes 'to be a human agent'. xix In any way soever, this deduction seems correct, but only if its premisses are acceptable. However, this discussion tries to show that they are deeply problematical.
The first premiss says that a human agent cannot not behave. This statement lies on the presupposition that there is no anti-behavior, or, in other words, behavior has no opposite. But this is nonsense, and argumentation must not have a counter-example to show its absurdity.
xx Consider first, that the application of any expression presupposes a rule by which it is decidable whether it could or could not be predicated for an entity.
xxi If anything an agent does is behaviour, then 'to do' entails 'to behave'; if an agent must (in every occasion) do something, then 'to do' includes 'to be'. But this is not suitable for the normal use of the terms 'to do', 'to behave' and 'to be', nor does it have any reasonably plus for a scientific language. Second, if a predicate or property must be stated for every argument in its extension then the application of that predicate or property is apodictical, in other words, analytical. It means that the meaning of the predicate is part of the meaning of the argument. So, if human agents must behave (in every occasion) then the meaning of 'to behave' is part of the meaning of 'to be a human agent', which seems to be absurd. And, finally, the reason of using a descriptive expression is that it could be true or false. When, in an observable situation, any state or action should be described as behaviour in any case, then the hypothesis that a human agent cannot not behave could not be falsified. But there is massive KOME − An International Journal of Pure Communication Inquiry Volume 1 Issue 1 p. 31-45. tradition behind the rule that refutability is one of the key requirements for any scientific hypothesis.
The situation is the very same with (12cb) which states that all behaviour in an interactional situation is communication. When it cannot be decided whether a behaviour is communication or not, then either there is no adequate rule for the application of both expressions, namely, 'communication' and 'behaviour' or they are synonyms, which is absurd. Furthermore, the complex expression 'behaviour in an interactional situation' uses an expression, namely interaction, which is often used as a synonym for communication in ordinary language. In this latter case (12cb) would not be absurd but trivial.
xxii And once again, if the question whether a behaviour in an interactional situation is communication or not could not be raised, than using both expressions has no scientific values in the world. xxiii After all, this paper proposes that the incapabilities derive from accepting the analyzed statement are based on a more fundamental misconception which should be explicated. This misconception derives from confusing communication with the fact, that every act and state could be considered as communication. This consideration, however, could be either true or false.
xxiv Let us consider a situation which is similar to an example of Watzlawick. An agent A is sitting on a pew with closed eyes, while an agent B tries to setting up hypotheses about A. Here the multifariousness of the hypotheses is the most conspicuous thing, since B could think that, for example: (13a) A does not want to communicate with B.
(13b) A likes to be shown mysterious, and he wants to be addressed by B.
(13c) A is sleeping.
(13d) A is dead.
(13e) A is in prayer.
And so on. The question could be raised: in which cases could anybody say that A communicates with B? In ordinary language the answer is easy, since only the cases (12a) and (12b) could be considered as communication between A and B, while (13c) and (13d) are not communications at all, and (13e) should be considered as a communication between A and C, namely God. Moreover, the propositions expressed by (13a) and (13b) contradict each other, so (at least) one of them should be false.
Of course objections could be made against this argumentation: one can say (with Watzlawick) that in the case of (13a) A communicates, that he don't want to communicate with B; in the case of (13b) A communicates, that he wants to communicate with B; in the case of (13c) A (or, at least, his body) communicates, that he is sleeping; in the case of (13d) the body of A communicates, that A is dead and in the case of (13e) A communicates with God and in addition, communicates to B that he communicates with God. But these objections confuse the mental state of B with the communication between A and B by all odds. This is only the mental capacities of an agent which enables him considering practically anything as communication. What is more, a human agent could consider not just other agent's actions and states as communications, but his own mental states as well.
xxv And the situation is the same with any physical, mental, social or ideal object in the past, in the present and in the future, with actual and with possible, or even impossible ones. there is an exceptionally odd shade in the statement that A thinks that a round square communicates with him.
So there is a capital difference between the following cases:
(14a) B communicates with A.
(14b) A thinks, that B communicates with A. If there were no difference between the situations expressed by (14a) and (14b) then there are no rules by which the term 'to communicate' can be correctly applied. Where the possibility of delusion cannot be emerged, there can be nothing to judge.
Conclusion
This discussion tried to show that analysis should play an operative role in consolidating a discipline. But analyses could not be achieved in a conceptual vacuum: they always presuppose a method and some basical concepts that serve as analysans. Moreover, there are many kinds of analyses that have the same logical structure but different presuppositions. This paper tried to explicate some of them. After ascertaining the necessity of analysis, the discussion applied its analytical methods on a so-called axiom of human communication, namely on the one which states that one cannot not communicate. If only an analysis of this kind would had been attempted earlier, then the axiom in question would not be so evident nowadays, because the analysis presented in this paper shows that the axiom is either false or meaningless. But it's evident, that in the process of consolidating a discipline, an imperious misconception could be as beneficial as an appropriate design at times. Of course here 'definition' means the fixation of an equality, but this equality surely cannot be intensional: no body thinks normally that '2' means '1+1', and it's easy to see that the number of equality-definitions for '2' is potentially infinite. But the notion that '2' and '1+1' refers to the same object, as in the case of extensional equality, seems to be problematic (at least for nominalists). This example represents the main problem with methodological definitions, and arguing for ‹communication;‹information processing›› is none the worse hard that arguing for ‹2;‹1+1››. v In most cases 'identity' signifies identification, which causes serious epistemological problems. vi This method goes back to von Wright's procedure in connection with the Kantian idea of 'Ought entails Can' (WRIGHT 1963) . vii Quine's slogan is 'to be is to be the value of a variable', which could narrow the scope of x in the case of (11) 
